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Category management is a business technique by which a retailer designates a 
manufacturer as a product category ￿manager￿ or ￿captain￿ and gives the 
designated manufacturer authority concerning retail shelf space allocation, 
promotion and product assortment inventory decisions.  In return, the retailer 
receives a lower wholesale price or a per unit time payment.  Increasing antitrust 
scrutiny has been applied to category manager arrangements, as exemplified by 
the Sixth Circuit￿s recent decision in Conwood Co. v. United States Tobacco. Co.  
This paper analyzes the law and economics of such arrangements.  Manufacturer 
payments for retail distribution (shelf space) are shown to be an element of the 
normal competitive process. Why this competition for retail distribution may 
also result in a shift in control over the shelf space allocation decision from the 
retailer to a manufacturer is then analyzed.  Finally, the paper examines current 
antitrust policy with regard to category management.  Once we understand the 
economics of competition for retail distribution, category management is seen as 
a pro-competitive aspect of retailing arrangements that benefits consumers. 
                                                 
♦  Benjamin Klein, Professor Emeritus of Economics, UCLA and Director, LECG, LLC.  Joshua 
Wright, Visiting Assistant Professor, George Mason University Law School.   
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Category management is a business technique by which retailers make 
decisions concerning shelf space allocation, promotion, and inventory by product 
category.1  Typically, category management involves a retailer designating a 
particular manufacturer as ￿category captain￿ or ￿category manager.￿  The role 
of the category manager is to provide input to the retailer regarding shelf space 
allocation decisions and product assortment.  Category management has been 
gaining popularity and has been adopted by an increasing number of retailers.2  
A recent study showed that 78% of department stores, 74% of discount stores, 
and 45% of supermarkets deploy category management.3 
Recently, the Federal Trade Commission￿s Report on slotting allowances 
and other grocery marketing practices included a discussion of category 
management.  The FTC Report states that ￿category management can produce 
                                                 
1 Category management has been employed in several retail trades for years, but is relatively new 
to the grocery retail industry.  FTC Report on Slotting Allowances and Grocery Marketing 
Practices (FTC Report), at 47.  Throughout the paper, the terms ￿retailer￿ and ￿distributor￿ are 
used interchangeably and will refer to product distribution generally. 
2 Progressive Grocer (December 1993). 
3 Chain Store Age (March 2000).  For example, it was reported that Borders Group, Inc. intended 
to move to category management relationships with a number of book publishers.  Reportedly, 
Borders will choose publishers to manage or co-manage over 250 categories in the store.  
Captains will assist Borders in the selecting which book titles will be carried and how the books 
will be displayed.  Borders is expected to retain the final say over which books are purchased.  
Publishers are thought to have superior knowledge on issues such as which books sell better 
together, which might sell better with book jackets facing outward, and how books should be 
located in the stores and on shelves.  It is reported that publishers may pay up to $110,000 
annually for the right to become a category manager.  See Wall Street Journal, Is Selling Books 
Like Selling Frozen Food, May 20, 2002. 
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significant efficiencies that will benefit retailers, manufacturers and consumers.￿4  
However, the FTC Report also listed two primary competitive concerns with the 
practice.  One of these concerns is horizontal collusion between either 
manufacturers or retailers.5  The second concern is that the captain may use its 
position to effectively exclude or significantly disadvantage competitors, 
exposing consumers to the risk of decreased product variety or increased prices.6  
The antitrust issues regarding horizontal collusion are adequately handled by the 
price-fixing provisions in the Sherman Act and are outside the scope of this 
paper, which deals with the second concern. 
The importance of a manufacturer￿s ￿category captain￿ status has played 
a role in recent antitrust litigation.  In Conwood Co. v. United States Tobacco Co., the 
United States Tobacco Co.￿s (USTC) was found to have abused its position as 
                                                 
4 FTC Report at 54. 
5  Id. at 51-52.  Colluding retailers may wish to coerce, or otherwise enlist, the category manager 
to facilitate the cartel.  Assuming it controls a sufficient share of the product market, the captain 
may administer the cartel by fixing a uniform retail price and allocating sales to the members of 
the cartel.  See Elizabeth Granitz & Benjamin Klein, Monopolization by ￿Raising Rivals￿ Costs￿: The 
Standard Oil Case, 39 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1996).  The FTC Report stresses the possibility of a tacit 
agreement amongst retailers facilitated by a captain that makes identical recommendations to all 
of the retailers and provides a common point of reference for pricing, promotion and product 
placement decisions of rivals.  FTC Report at 51.  Similarly, category management may 
potentially facilitate a manufacturer cartel.  Colluding manufacturers may wish to fix the retail 
price rather than the wholesale price in order to lower the costs of detecting cheating.  The FTC 
Report raises the concern that leading manufacturers could ￿confer and agree on a category 
management recommendation.￿  FTC Report at 53.  Each of these arrangements requires a 
horizontal agreement between retailers or manufacturers that is vulnerable to legal attack by 
traditional Sherman Act Section 1 conspiracy doctrine.   
6 FTC Report at 51. 
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category captain to violate Section 2 of the Sherman Act.7  The court stated that 
￿Conwood does not challenge USTC￿s role as category manager per se, but 
rather the manner in which it used its position as a monopolist providing 
category management services, i.e. to exclude it from competition￿ and affirmed 
a $1.05 billion verdict against USTC.8  The decision highlights general issues of 
antitrust policy with respect to the competitive process for distribution of 
products and raises specific issues concerning what additional legal constraints 
the Sherman Act imposes on dominant firms that have been designated as 
category manager. 
The fundamental economic question addressed by this paper is: ￿why 
would a retailer shift control over the shelf space allocation decision to a 
manufacturer?￿  A proper answer to that question requires an understanding of 
the economic forces at work in distribution contracts involving retailer 
promotional efforts generally, and retailer supply of shelf space more 
specifically.  Only then can a useful framework for analyzing promotional 
contracts between manufacturers and retailers be derived along with a critique of 
current antitrust policy with respect to category management practices, 
exemplified by the misleading analysis in Conwood. 
                                                 
7 Conwood Co. v. United States Tobacco Co., 290 F.3d 768 (6th Cir. 2002). 
8 290 F.3d at 786-87. 
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Manufacturers often purchase retailer promotional efforts, with shelf 
space considered in this paper a form of retailer promotional efforts.  For 
example, a retailer may grant the manufacturer a specified percentage of shelf 
space or an exclusive contract over the shelf space, or designate the manufacturer 
as category manager.  Manufacturers may compensate retailers for such shelf 
space in a number of ways that fall into two general categories: (1) per unit time 
payments, such as slotting fees; and (2) per unit sale payments, such as a 
discounted wholesale price, often used in conjunction with resale price 
maintenance (RPM). 
While shelf space may not be considered intuitively equivalent to other 
forms of retailer promotional effort, such as the time a salesperson spends with a 
customer, or in-store advertising displays,9 shelf space performs an identical 
economic function.  Provision of eye-level shelf space or a large percentage of 
retailer shelf space allocated to a particular product may increase the value of the 
product to some consumers.  Promotion serves the function of increasing the 
reservation values of particular consumers.  The provision of quantitatively or 
qualitatively superior shelf space may also increase the reservation values of 
particular consumers, especially those without a strong brand preference that 
                                                 
9 The promotional impact of shelf space concerns the supply of shelf space for one product in a 
category relative to another.  The aggregate amount of shelf space remains the same when a 
retailer promotes a product within a category.  Other forms of retailer promotional effort are 
intuitively different because there may be insufficient aggregate amount of other forms. 
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might be especially sensitive to a retailer featuring a particular brand on its 
shelves. 
Section 2 considers the role of retailer shelf space as a form of promotion 
and the contracting environment facing manufacturers and retailers in providing 
the correct amount of shelf space.  The conditions under which it might be 
efficient for manufacturers to purchase shelf space from retailers is addressed.  
Section 3 examines the retailer￿s incentive to violate the contract for the supply of 
shelf space by promoting rival products, and the costs and benefits of using 
exclusivity as a method of controlling this incentive.  Section 4 shows how 
category manager contracts facilitate self-enforcement by optimally shifting the 
potential for nonperformance from the retailer to the manufacturer.  In this way 
retailers may be able to obtain the best of both worlds by receiving manufacturer 
payments under conditions where it is not economical to provide an exclusive 
right to shelf space because consumers demand increased variety.  Section 5 
discusses the antitrust law and economics of category management contracts, 
including an analysis of when exclusionary distribution contracts may be 
anticompetitive.  The Conwood decision is then examined through the lens of 
these economic insights. 
Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press 
  6
2.  Why Manufacturers Purchase Retail Shelf Space 
Promotional activity is a way to induce sales that would not occur 
otherwise.  These incremental sales are made to ￿marginal consumers,￿ defined 
as consumers who would not otherwise purchase the product, or as additional 
sales to existing consumers.  A retailer, for example, may provide a dedicated 
sales staff which will explain the virtues of a particular product, provide 
demonstrations, or otherwise convince a particular consumer to purchase this 
particular manufacturer￿s product.  These promotional services are supplied at a 
zero price as a way to provide an effective price discount to marginal consumers 
by increasing the reservation values of ￿marginal￿ buyers who would not 
otherwise purchase the product at the market price.  Marginal consumers 
generally consume a relatively large fraction of these promotional services 
because ￿infra-marginal￿ consumers, those with a strong brand preference or 
who are otherwise already purchasing the product, are likely to avoid the time 
costs involved in consuming the promotion. 
An assumption underlying the analysis of manufacturer purchase of 
retailer shelf space is that the provision of shelf space affects the reservation 
values of some marginal consumers.10  The analysis of the shelf space allocation 
problem in this paper relies on the economic function of shelf space as retailer 
                                                 
10 This assumption has some empirical support.  See Adam Rennhoff, A Theoretical and Empirical 
Investigation of Slotting Allowances in the Grocery Industry (2002). 
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promotional activity.  Shelf space differs from the provision of product 
demonstration and salesperson attention in some fundamental respects.  For 
example, shelf space is a public-type good in the sense that retailer shelf space 
allocation featuring a particular product is not consumed by any one shopper at 
the expense of another.  However, so is advertising, which is a manufacturer-
supplied substitute for shelf space.  This practical distinction is irrelevant for the 
purposes of the economic analysis contained herein.  While marginal consumers 
cannot be said to consume a relatively large fraction of the shelf space, there exist 
consumers that are particularly sensitive to shelf space allocation.  Therefore, the 
goal of the provision of a large quantity or superior quality of shelf space is 
therefore to increase the reservation value of the shelf-space-sensitive consumer 
to the prevailing market price.   
In general, distributors will not provide the desired level of shelf space 
from the manufacturer￿s point of view because distributors will not take account 
of the incremental manufacturer profit when making their shelf space decisions.  
The manufacturer earns a mark-up above marginal cost on each unit because it 
faces a downward sloping demand curve for its product.  Thus, joint profits 
increase from the provision of shelf space if the manufacturer mark-up exceeds 
the marginal cost of providing the level of services that induce the purchase of an 
additional unit.  Because the retailer does not take into account the effect of his 
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provision of promotional services on the manufacturer￿s profits when deciding 
what level of promotional service to provide, the retailer must be compensated 
for the provision of these services.11 
It follows from this proposition that additional retailer provision of a high 
quantity or superior quality of shelf space will be particularly important when 
the manufacturer is selling a product with a wholesale price significantly higher 
than marginal cost.12  However, even where a manufacturer stands to gain 
substantially from incremental sales, the retailer will not provide the additional 
shelf space if the costs of providing those services are greater than the revenues it 
earns as a result of the promotion.   
In general, if all consumers value the shelf space more than the costs of 
providing the shelf space, distributor competition would result in the desired 
level of shelf space by simply charging higher prices to consumers.  However, 
the provision of ￿extra￿ shelf space is a way to generate incremental sales by 
                                                 
11 Benjamin Klein, The Economics of Slotting Fees, American Bar Association ￿ Antitrust Section 
(2001). 
12 It is generally reported that the magnitude and frequency of slotting allowances, or per unit 
time payments from manufacturers to retailers for the provision of shelf space, has increased in 
recent years.  FTC Report, at 11.  Increased product differentiation and mark-ups in products sold 
in grocery retail outlets is consistent with this empirical observation.  Measures of manufacturer 
￿value-added,￿ defined as the difference between costs of production and the value of shipments, 
has increased 23% from 1992 to 1997.  See Michael J. Harris, Food Manufacturing in U.S. Food 
Marketing System 2002 (USDA Economic Research Service).  This increase in product 
differentiation expenditures implies higher manufacturer margins, and increasing gains to be had 
from retailer promotional effort, such as provision of shelf space. 
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providing ￿infra-marginal￿ consumers who in fact are not willing to pay for the 
services in the form of a higher price an effective price discount.  The provision 
of shelf space is therefore analogous to promotional activity giving an effective 
price discount to marginal consumers whose reservation values for a particular 
product are sensitive to shelf space allocation. 
Since in many distribution relationships manufacturers desire retailers to 
supply a greater level of promotion than they would otherwise provide, the 
payments will flow from the manufacturer to the distributor.  Whether the 
payments are per unit time (e.g., a slotting fee) or per unit sale (a wholesale price 
discount), the payments are compensation of distributors for increasing the level 
of shelf space supplied.   
The manufacturer compensation side of the distribution contract may be 
viewed as a method for manufacturers to secure promotional effort.  This 
promotional theory of vertical contractual relationships, discussed by Klein & 
Murphy, suggests that the manufacturers cannot rely on the retailer to provide 
the correct level of promotional effort.13  This broadly applicable theory is 
developed here in the context of contracts over the provision of a particular type 
of retailer promotional service ￿ shelf space. 
                                                 
13 Benjamin Klein & Kevin Murphy, Vertical Restraints as Contract Enforcement Mechanisms, 31 
J.L. & ECON. 265 (1988). 
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In some cases, consumers may value the provision of retailer shelf space 
more than the costs of providing the services.  If this condition holds, retail 
competition would provide the correct level of shelf space because the retailer 
may be compensated for the provision of shelf space through a higher retail 
price.  Therefore, a key economic assumption underlying the analysis of 
manufacturer compensation for retailer provision of shelf space is that 
consumers are not willing to pay for the provision of those services.  As 
discussed above, ￿marginal￿ consumers are likely to be more sensitive to shelf 
space allocation than ￿infra-marginal￿ consumers with less responsiveness to 
shelf space allocation due to strong brand preference, for example.  Because 
infra-marginal consumers do not value the extra shelf space provided by the 
retailer, the retailer cannot be compensated for the provision of the services by 
charging a higher retail price.  Therefore, the provision of extra shelf space raises 
the reservation values of some marginal consumers to the market price, thereby 
giving those consumers what can be thought of as an effective price discount.   
The manufacturer is able to increase his level of sales by effectively 
lowering the price to, which can also be conceptualized as raising the reservation 
value of, those consumers who are highly sensitive to the provision of these 
services and charging a higher price to those consumers who are not.  Because of 
this distortion, manufacturers must compensate retailers for the provision of 
http://law.bepress.com/alea/14th/art55 
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shelf space.  Regardless of the form manufacturers use to compensate retailers, 
the manufacturer-retailer combination will be unable to achieve the jointly profit-
maximizing outcome without manufacturer purchase of shelf space.14 
3.  Exclusivity Facilitates Self-Enforcement of the Retailer Promotion 
Supply Contract 
As shown, manufacturer compensation of retailers for the provision of 
shelf space is necessary under certain conditions.  However, retailers receiving 
this premium for the supply of shelf space have the incentive to substitute their 
promotional efforts towards rival products.  Exclusive dealing contracts are one 
method by which manufacturers can control the retailer incentive to substitute 
the supply of promotional effort to rival products by facilitating performance of 
the contract.  Understanding how exclusivity facilitates performance of the 
contract and control￿s the retailer￿s incentives is important to understanding the 
related mechanism of ￿category captain￿ designation functions. 
                                                 
14 This motivation for vertical restraints is not the ￿classic dealer free riding￿ discussed by Lester 
Telser where the restraint prevents ￿discount￿ retailers from free-riding on the services provided 
by a particular retailer after the retailer has supplied the services.  See Lester Telser, Why Should 
Manufacturers Want Fair Trade?, 3 J.L. & ECON. 86 (1960). This rationale for vertical restraints 
prevents retail competition from undermining the compensation mechanism chosen by 
manufacturers and retailers to reach the jointly profit-maximizing choice of price, output and 
promotional services.  See generally, Klein & Murphy, supra note 13. 
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3.1.  Retailers Have an Incentive to Violate the Contract by 
Substituting Promotional Effort Towards Rival Products 
The incentive to promote the sale of rival products follows from the 
nature of promotional activity.  As discussed, promotional effort such as the 
provision of shelf space is aimed at creating incremental sales from those who 
would not have otherwise purchased the product but are particularly sensitive to 
shelf-space allocation.  Recall that the marginal consumers, those with 
reservation values lower than the market price and with sensitivity to shelf space 
allocation, are not likely to have any strong brand preference.  Therefore, 
marginal consumers are likely to be willing to purchase a rival, low brand-name 
product in response to a retailer￿s promotional efforts.  A low brand-name 
product may produce a higher margin for the retailer because it purchases the 
product at a wholesale price much closer to marginal cost than the differentiated, 
high mark-up product paying for promotion.15  Even if the rival product is sold 
at the same wholesale price as the product paying for shelf space, the retailer 
might have the incentive to promote the rival product if the costs of promoting 
that product are lower.   
For example, a customer asking for a rival, equal-margined, brand might 
not be greeted with promotion of the manufacturer￿s product because the costs 
                                                 
15 See Benjamin Klein, Exclusive Dealing as Competition for Distribution ￿On the Merits,￿ 
GMULR (forthcoming 2004), at 43. 
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of promotion will reduce the retailer￿s profit margin.  In the shelf space context, 
provision of promotional effort is limited to allocating shelf space in the manner 
required by contract.  A retailer may choose not to ￿feature￿ the manufacturer￿s 
brand by providing the quantitative and qualitative level of shelf space specified, 
and instead, feature a low-brand name rival product providing the retailer a 
higher profit margin.  A retailer may also choose not to provide the 
manufacturer￿s desired level of shelf space if it perceives that many consumers 
are coming to the shelves searching for a rival product because the costs of 
providing the ￿featured￿ shelf space may provide a lower margin for the retailer 
than choosing not to promote the manufacturer￿s product. 
In essence, a retailer has the incentive to deviate from the shelf-space 
agreement by accepting the manufacturer￿s payments and not performing by 
selling its promotional efforts twice or failing to provide the correct level of shelf 
space.   Specifically, a retailer sells its ￿featured￿ shelf space to the manufacturer 
in exchange for payments and does not provide that shelf space to the retailer or 
features a rival product.   
3.2.  Exclusivity Permits Manufacturers to Control the Retailer 
Incentive to Violate the Contract by Promoting Rival Products 
Unless the manufacturer can control the distributor incentive to promote 
rival products, a manufacturer will not continue to provide payments for 
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  14
promotional effort, and the joint-profit maximizing outcome will not be reached.  
Exclusive dealing, then, is a way for manufacturers to control the ability of 
distributors to substitute away towards rival products and increases the 
probability that a manufacturer receives the promotional effort it has purchased 
from the distributor.   
A manufacturer must monitor the retailer to assure that it is receiving the 
level of promotional effort contractually specified, as well as monitor the 
exclusive and non-contractible elements of the agreement.  One efficiency benefit 
of exclusivity is that the requirement lowers the monitoring costs of the 
manufacturer who need only be certain that the retailer is not selling other 
products.  Exclusive dealing therefore reduces the distributor incentive to free-
ride on the manufacturer￿s compensation mechanism and therefore facilitates an 
efficient solution to the incentive incompatibility of the manufacturer and 
distributor with respect to the provision of promotional effort. 
By contractually controlling retailer non-performance, it increases the 
probability that given a level of manufacturer monitoring costs and 
compensation for promotion, the contractual understanding is self-enforcing.  By 
preventing dealers from using their shelf space and promotional effort from 
promoting rival brands, exclusive dealing allows retailers to receive the benefit 
of the premium stream paid by manufacturers over a greater period of time, and 
http://law.bepress.com/alea/14th/art55 
  15
the value of retailer promotion purchased by the manufacturer increases.16  
Further, exclusive dealing facilitates self-enforcement by shifting the ability to 
non-perform from the retailer to the manufacturer as well as decreasing 
monitoring costs.  The self-enforcement mechanisms at work will be discussed 
further in Section 4.   
3.3. Self-Enforcing  Contractual  Arrangements17 
  The incomplete contracts literature has provided valuable insight into 
understanding the interplay between institutional settings, contracting 
                                                 
16 Increased promotional activity for the manufacturer￿s product by reducing the ability to 
promote rivals has been accepted as an efficiency rationale for exclusive dealing in Joyce 
Beverages v. Royal Crown Cola Co., 555 F. Supp. 271 (S.D.N.Y. 1983), and Hendricks Music Co. v. 
Steinway, Inc., 689 F. Supp. 1501, 1545 (N.D. Ill. 1988) (￿Steinway argues that the existence in one 
dealership of two competing [concert and artist] programs creates a conflict of interests and that 
it is therefore justified in its insistence that dealers represent the Steinway [concert and artist] 
program exclusively . . ..  The court finds Steinway￿s position more persuasive.￿).  See also Fran 
Welch Real Estate Sales, Inc. v. Seabrook Island Co., 621 F. Supp. 128, 138 (S.C. 1985) (holding 
that ￿there are valid and procompetitive business reasons for exclusive listing agreements.  Such 
agreements . . . benefit both the real estate agent and the property seller, protecting the agent 
from the risk of a wasted investment of time and money and providing the property seller with 
assurance that the agent will utilize his or her best efforts to market the property.￿).  Whether or 
not this efficiency rationale is well-accepted is a debatable proposition.  While few district court 
cases have addressed the issue and supported the ￿focus dealer services￿ or ￿dedicated 
distributor￿ rationale for exclusive dealing, a recent antitrust decision explicitly rejects this 
rationale.  See United States v. Dentsply Int￿l, Inc., No. 99-005-SLR, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14139, 
153 (D. Del. Aug. 9, 2003).  Benjamin Klein notes that the Dentsply court rejected this rationale in 
part because Dentsply￿s economic expert was Howard Marvel, whose 1982 paper states that 
enhancing dealer services cannot be the justification for exclusive dealing.  Klein, supra note 15, at 
n. 99.  
17 The discussion of self-enforcing contractual mechanisms in the category captain context is an 
application of the work on incomplete contracts and self-enforcement by Benjamin Klein and 
others.  See, e.g. Klein & Leffler, The Role of Market Forces in Assuring Contractual Performance, 
89(4) Journal of Political Economy 615 (1981); Klein, Why Hold-Ups Occur: The Self-Enforcing 
Range of Contractual Relationships, 34 Economic Inquiry 444 (1996); Klein & Murphy, Vertical 
Restraints as Contract Enforcement Mechanisms, 31 J. L. & ECON. 265 (1988); Klein & Murphy, 
Vertical Integration as a Self-Enforcing Contractual Arrangement, 87 Am. Econ. Rev. 415 (1997). 
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environments and the competitive process.18  The strand of incomplete contracts 
literature emphasizing self-enforcement of contractual arrangements, as opposed 
to understanding contract terms as minimizing transactor malincentives given 
that performance cannot be directly contracted on, has significantly increased the 
state of knowledge regarding the contracting process.   
One important contribution of this literature was providing a theoretical 
framework for understanding the role of increased prices as a mechanism to 
assure supply of quality services by a retailer.19  This framework allows category 
management to be understood as one method by which manufacturers earn a 
return on their compensation to retailers for shelf space, whether those payments 
are per unit time or per unit sale.20  Analysis of contract terms in this self-
enforcement framework has helped to explain the role of distribution 
arrangements such as RPM, exclusive territories, as well and franchise 
                                                 
18 See, e.g., Klein, Crawford and Alchian, Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents and 
Competitive Contracting Process, 21 J. L. & ECON. 297 (1978); Klein, Why Hold-Ups Occur: The 
Self-Enforcing Range of Contractual Relationships, 34 Economic Inquiry 444 (1996); Klein & 
Murphy, Vertical Restraints as Contract Enforcement Mechanisms, 31 J. L. & ECON. 265 (1988); 
Klein & Murphy, Vertical Integration as a Self-Enforcing Contractual Arrangement, 87 Am. Econ. 
Rev. 415 (1997); Williamson, The Economic Institutions of Capitalism (1985); Klein, Fisher-
General Motors and the Nature of the Firm, 43 J. L. & ECON. (2000). 
19 See Klein & Leffler, supra note 17. 
20 A per unit sale payment in the form of a reduction in the wholesale price in conjunction with 
RPM is complementary to the per unit sale payment and necessary when inter-retailer 
competition is likely to compete away the manufacturer￿s compensation for shelf space. 
http://law.bepress.com/alea/14th/art55 
  17
agreements.21  This Section analyzes exclusive dealing between manufacturers 
and retailers as a self-enforcing arrangement.  Like exclusive dealing, category 
management arrangements are self-enforcing, but involve different implicit 
promises being made between the manufacturer and retailer.  The implicit 
promises of category management arrangements will be discussed in Section 4. 
  A self-enforcement mechanism operates when parties can impose 
sanctions on each other by threatening the termination of the relationship for 
non-performance of the written and unwritten terms of the contractual 
understanding.22  In a world of necessarily incomplete contracts caused by 
measurement and monitoring costs, transactors knowingly leave themselves 
susceptible to some possibility of hold-up.  The role of contract terms under this 
view is not solely to create incentives for some court-enforceable notion of 
performance, but also to broaden the self-enforcing range of the parties￿ 
contractual understanding.  
Consider one party to a contract contemplating ￿holding-up￿ the other 
party by engaging in some type of non-performance with respect to a written or 
                                                 
21 See Klein & Murphy, Vertical Restraints as Contract Enforcement Mechanisms, 31 J. L. & ECON. 
265 (1988); Benjamin Klein, Distribution Restrictions Operate By Creating Dealer Profits: 
Explaining the Use of Maximum Resale Price Maintenance in State Oil v. Khan, 9 Sup. Ct. Econ. 
Rev. 1 (1999); Klein, The Economics of Franchise Contracts, 2 Journal of Corporate Finance 9 
(1995).  As suggested in this paper, the analysis also provides a framework for understanding per 
unit time payments to retailers for shelf space ￿ slotting allowances.  See Benjamin Klein & Joshua 
Wright, The Economics of Slotting Arrangements (working paper, available from the authors). 
22 Klein & Murphy, supra note 13. 
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unwritten term of the understanding.  Transactors evaluate the short term gains 
earned from cheating on the agreement, i.e., not performing consistently with the 
contractual understanding.  If this value is less than the discounted expected 
future profit stream a transactor will lose if the relationship is terminated for 
non-performance, performance is assured. 
For simplicity, define W1 as the short-term gain from cheating on the 
agreement and W2 as the capital cost of the sanction imposed on the firm when it 
deviates from the performance contemplated by the agreement.23  W2 measures 
the ability of a party to sanction a non-performing party, and represents the 
transactor￿s reputational capital. 
Contract terms themselves play a role in facilitating self-enforcement.24  In 
order to ensure performance, transactors desire to design a contract that will 
economize on limited reputational capital and maintain W2 >W1  for the widest 
range of possible contingencies.  In this sense, contract terms can be seen as 
facilitating self-enforcement by either reducing W1 or increasing W2.  The 
                                                 
23 In the simple version of this model, the decision faced by the firm is identical to that of the 
agent in infinitely repeated prisoner￿s dilemma games.  By stretching out the time horizon the 
game is played, one increases the level of ￿punishment￿ available to the agents increases the 
probability that the cooperative solution is attained.  The original model by Klein & Leffler makes 
this point, see supra note 17, at n.11.  The model can be extended by assuming a finite life time for 
the agents.  The key economic link between the models is the relationship of time horizon to the 
probability of a self-enforcing equilibrium. 
24 This explanation of the role of contract terms in self-enforcing arrangements is a summary of 
the theory discussed in Klein, The Role of Incomplete Contracts in Self Enforcing Relationships, 
92 Revue D￿Economie Industrielle 67 (2000). 
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economics literature focuses on the role of contractual specification in decreasing 
W1 , the gains from short-run deviations from the understanding.  However, it 
would be prohibitively costly to reduce W1 to zero or suppress it below the value 
of the expected future profit stream from the agreement.  By economizing on 
available, but limited reputational capital, transactors may include contract terms 
that increase W2. 
4.  Designating a Category Manager Allows Retailers to Obtain the Ability 
to Sell Shelf Space While Minimizing Loss of Product Variety 
Understanding the benefits of exclusive dealing in facilitating an efficient 
solution to the incentive incompatibility between the manufacturer and 
distributors provides the basis for understanding category management 
contracts.  However, the key economic insight linking exclusive dealing and 
category management is best viewed by examining the costs of an exclusive 
dealing arrangement.  Specifically, an exclusive dealing arrangement is costly in 
the somewhat obvious sense that it reduces the variety faced by consumers. 
Retailers face a trade-off between carrying a reduced variety and 
accepting a manufacturer￿s payment for extra promotional effort, or selling 
increased variety without manufacturer subsidization of promotion.  Where 
consumer demand for variety is high, exclusivity does not make economic sense 
for the retailer.  Under the condition that distributors operate in competitive 
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industries, retailers will have the correct incentive to choose the profit-
maximizing combination of variety and manufacturer subsidy.  Where 
consumers value variety, it will not pay for retailers to grant manufacturers 
exclusives.  In these instances of high consumer demand for variety, category 
management is a less restrictive alternative to appropriating the benefits of 
exclusivity in terms of reducing distributor incentive to promote rival products. 
Consumers are likely to have a strong preference for variety in some 
circumstances.  Where consumers value variety, a retailer granting a 
manufacturer an exclusive right to shelf space is likely to suffer costs associated 
with customers switching retailers in order to seek greater product variety, or 
otherwise reducing purchases.  Designating a category manager for products 
where consumers demand variety allows the retailer to obtain the benefits of (1) 
receiving manufacturer payments for shelf space in the form of per unit time or 
per unit sale discounts, (2) maximizing the return received by retailers by 
making the shelf space sold to the manufacturer more valuable; and (3) 
minimizing the costs associated with loss of product variety. 
Designation as a category manager provides the manufacturer some of the 
benefits of an exclusive.  Specifically, giving the manufacturer the right to control 
the retailer shelf space decisions with respect to product allocation significantly 
reduces the ability of the retailer to promote rival products.  Like exclusive 
http://law.bepress.com/alea/14th/art55 
  21
dealing, designation of a category manager reduces the retailer￿s incentive to 
promote rival products and is therefore an alternative method of facilitating the 
contractual arrangement.  Because the retailer￿s ability to deviate from the 
promotion contract is limited, manufacturers with rational expectations will 
purchase shelf space in order to induce incremental sales. 
A second benefit of designating a category manager is that it increases the 
value of the shelf space sold to the manufacturer.  Even without prevention of 
retailer ￿free-riding￿ on the manufacturer￿s shelf space payments, granting the 
manufacturer a category manager position may increase the value of the shelf 
space provided to manufacturers and therefore maximize the return earned by 
retailers providing promotional services.25  To understand why the value of the 
shelf space might increase by selling to a manufacturer along with the right to 
provide category management services, one must start with the analysis of why 
selling the manufacturer an exclusive might do so. 
In some circumstances, a retailer may grant a manufacturer an exclusive on 
its shelf space because it is efficient to deliver all of the customers to one 
manufacturer.  The reason that it might be efficient for a manufacturer to deliver 
all of its customers to one manufacturer, even without the added benefits of 
eliminating retailer free-riding on the manufacturer￿s shelf space payments by 
                                                 
25 See Klein, supra note 15, at 50. 
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promoting rival products, is because the retailer may be able to increase the 
elasticity of demand faced by each manufacturer bidding for the shelf space 
exclusive.  In other words, because each manufacturer knows that the retailer is 
delivering all or most of its customers to the manufacturer who wins the bid for 
the retailer￿s shelf space, the manufacturer￿s willingness to drive the wholesale 
price down (or increase the per unit time payment) is greater than if the 
manufacturer￿s product was on the shelf competing with other products.26 
Designating a particular manufacturer as category manager is another 
method by which a retailer may increase the value of its shelf space under 
conditions where consumers￿ demand for variety imposes costs sufficient to 
make granting an exclusive uneconomical.  Even under conditions where 
category management did not facilitate enforcement of the contract by reducing 
or eliminating the incentive of retailers to use the category manager￿s space to 
promote rival products, designating a category manager increases the value of 
the shelf space provided to the retailer.  Like granting an exclusive to the 
manufacturer and therefore delivering all or most of the retailer￿s customers, 
                                                 
26 Benjamin Klein argues that this analysis might explain the shelf space contracts in FTC v. 
McCormick (FTC File NO. 961-0050).  See Klein, supra note 15, at 52.  Klein￿s analysis suggests 
that because the particular brand of spices sold at a grocery store is not a major determinant of 
where consumers decide to shop, the costs associated with reduction of product variety are not 
high. Under these conditions, the retailer may ￿deliver￿ all or most of its customers to the 
manufacturer and therefore increase the value of the shelf space offered to the retailer and in 
turn, increase the payments received from the manufacturer. 
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designating a category manager is a method by which the retailer can commit to 
featuring a particular brand and providing extra shelf space to that 
manufacturer.  Delivery of the ￿extra￿ shelf space and featuring the 
manufacturer￿s product delivers a greater number of sales to the category 
manager than it would otherwise receive and therefore increases the value of the 
shelf space and the manufacturer￿s willingness to pay. 
It is obvious that featuring the manager￿s product is likely to decrease 
product variety less than if an exclusive is granted.  The more important 
economic point is that designating a category manager is a way for the parties to 
obtain some of the benefits of exclusive dealing in terms of increasing the value 
of the shelf space, while minimizing the costs associated with reducing product 
variety.27  In product markets where consumer demand for variety is not such 
                                                 
27 One way to think about a category manager designation is as the retailer providing an 
￿exclusive promotion￿ contract rather than an exclusive on the retailer￿s shelf space.  The implicit 
understanding between the manufacturer and retailer is essentially that the retailer will only 
promote the manager￿s product through the provision of a greater quantity and quality of shelf 
space.  In turn, the manager￿s obligation is to pay for the shelf space with a per unit time or per 
unit sale contract, and to make recommendations to the retailer or design shelf space allocations 
that will not harm the retailer in terms of reduced variety.  A similar method of obtaining the 
benefits of exclusive promotion while minimizing the costs associated with demand for product 
variety is to contract, where feasible, for exclusive promotion of one product while allowing 
customers who demand another variety to receive that product upon request.  Benjamin Klein 
suggests that this analysis describes Microsoft￿s contracts with Internet access providers such as 
America Online, who agreed to exclusively promote Internet Explorer for two years and 
contractually guaranteed that a minimum of 85% of new subscribers would use Internet Explorer 
technology.  Klein, supra note 15, at 53-55.  The designation of a category manager or use of a 
contractual device to ensure the satisfaction of those consumers with a specific demand for 
another product are alternative methods for limiting the costs associated with reduced product 
variety while obtaining the benefits of exclusive promotion, specifically, increasing the value of 
the promotional effort sold to the manufacturer. 
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that the reduction in variety associated with featuring a particular product is 
prohibitively costly, designating a category manager is a method available to 
retailers to increase the value of the shelf space they offer to manufacturers.  
Retailers therefore force manufacturers seeking this extra promotion, and 
specifically the increased profits from obtaining incremental sales, to compete for 
delivery of a larger number of customers.  This increased incentive to compete 
for distribution as a result of the increasing elasticity of demand faced by each 
manufacturer maximizes the return to the retailer from the sale of their customer 
base and increases the payments made to retailers in per unit time or per unit 
sale form.  The increase in payments results in either a greater reduction in the 
wholesale price than would be obtained from competition between retailers on 
the shelves without a manager, or an increase in per unit time payments to the 
retailer.  In either event, competition at the retail level passes these payments on 
to customers in the form of a reduced retail price or an increase in quality 
supplied.28 
                                                 
28 One concern regarding per unit time payments such as slotting allowances is that they will not 
be passed on to consumers, in contrast to wholesale price reductions or per unit sales shelf space 
payments.  However, this analysis assumes that competition will only occur on one margin, the 
price of the category manager￿s good.  Given free entry into grocery retail, any payments above 
the competitive rate of return can be expected to be competed away.  Lump sum payments such 
as slotting allowances may be competed away by price discounts on products likely to increase 
grocery traffic rather than the category manager￿s product. 
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4.1.  The Self-Enforcement Mechanism of Category Manager 
Contracts 
This Section explores the implicit understanding that might exist between 
the parties in category management contracts and the self-enforcement 
mechanism of such implicit contracts. 
Analysis of the self-enforcing contractual arrangement starts with defining 
the implicit understanding between the category manager and the retailer.  The 
implicit understanding regarding the terms of retailer performance is to supply 
the level of shelf space desired by the manufacturer.  On the manager side, 
however, the agreed upon performance us likely to vary.  For example, a retailer 
may expect the manager to make suggestions regarding shelf space allocation, 
provide data, or it may give complete control of the shelf space allocation 
decisions to the manager.  The manager is also expected to supply a sufficient 
level of product variety.  Self-enforcement analysis suggests that each party to 
the contract will continue to perform in a manner consistent with the implicit 
understanding so long as the expected premium stream earned by the party over 
the life of the agreement is greater than the gains from cheating.  Using the 
framework above, the parties will continue to perform as long as W2 > W1.  The 
following section explores the performance decision faced by both the retailer 
and the manager. 
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A.  Retailer Performance is to Supply Promotional Effort  
The retailer￿s performance is the supply of shelf space featuring the 
manager￿s product.  The retailer￿s gains from short-run cheating on the category 
management relationship, W1, is defined by the gains from the retailer from 
promoting a rival product or supplying less than the agreed upon level of shelf 
space to the retailer.  As discussed above, exclusive dealing significantly reduces 
the incentive of the retailer to deviate from the agreement and therefore 
facilitates contractual enforcement.  Likewise, designating a manufacturer as 
category manager reduces the retailer￿s incentive to cheat by placing the shelf-
space decisions in the hands of the manager.  Reducing the incentive to cheat 
increases the probability that the category management relationship remains 
within the self-enforcing range over the maximum number of possible 
contingencies.  On the other hand, W2, the premium stream earned by the 
retailer, consists of the per unit time or per unit sale payments paid by the 
manufacturer over the duration of the agreement.  From the retailer￿s 
perspective, designating a category manager allows the retailer to earn not only 
the benefits of manufacturer payments, but also minimize the costs associated 
with the reduction in product variety. 
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B.  Manufacturer Performance is to Supply Promised Variety  
The manager￿s performance is the supply of a sufficient level of product 
variety.  Therefore, manager cheating may be defined as supply of less than the 
￿optimal￿ level of variety.  The implicit understanding is that the manager will 
feature his own product by allocating it a greater quantity and quality of shelf 
space than the manager would receive without payments.  However, the 
manager is also expected to provide sufficient variety with the remaining shelf 
space such that the allocation minimizes the costs imposed on the retailer by the 
reduction in variety.  Therefore, the gains from manager short-run cheating on 
the category management relationship, W1, are defined by extra profits earned by 
the manager by supplying its own product ￿too much￿ shelf space.  W2, the gains 
to the retailer from continued performance, is defined as the ￿extra￿ profits 
earned by the manager over the duration of the agreement by receiving the 
￿featured￿ quantity and quality of shelf space from the retailer.  Because the 
manager stands to lose these extra profits upon termination, the manager will 
provide a sufficient level of product variety as long as W2 > W1.   
The economics of self-enforcing contractual arrangements shed some light 
on the category management relationship and the implicit understanding 
between the parties, as well as the benefits flowing to both the manager and the 
retailer as a result of the agreement.  USTC was recently found to have abused its 
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category manager position in violation of the Sherman Act in a number of ways, 
including unauthorized removal and destruction of competitors￿ display racks 
and product.  The self-enforcement analysis in this section would suggest that 
the retailers would be protected from such manager conduct clearly outside the 
implicit understanding of the relationship with the threat of terminating the 
relationship. 
Having completed the economic analysis of category management within 
the self-enforcement framework, Section 5 proceeds with an analysis of the 
antitrust law of category management and the legal duties faced by category 
managers.   
5.  Antitrust Law and Category Management  
Antitrust law has generally accepted the economic justification for 
exclusive dealing that is at the heart of the economic analysis of category 
management in this paper: prevention of retailer free-riding on the 
manufacturer￿s compensation.  While category management has rarely been 
addressed by antitrust law specifically, the economic analysis above suggests 
that category management is a less restrictive means of achieving prevention of 
retailer free-riding on the manufacturer￿s compensation mechanism than 
exclusive dealing.  It follows that one would expect a more lenient antitrust 
standard applied to category management than to exclusive dealing.  
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Paradoxically, Conwood, the only appellate level decision directly addressing the 
legal duties facing a category manager and providing guidance to counsel 
advising firms implementing category management programs, appears to 
impose greater legal duties on category managers. 
This Section addresses the economic conditions under which an 
anticompetitive effect may result from a dominant manufacturer￿s use of 
exclusionary contracts with distributors, recent developments in the antitrust law 
of distribution contracts, and concludes with an analysis of the landmark 
￿category management￿ decision in Conwood. 
5.1.  When Exclusive Distribution Contracts May be Anticompetitive 
The sale of a product often involves two stages, manufacturing and 
distribution.  A manufacturer produces the product and sells it to a distributor, 
who then sells it to consumers.  The sale of grocery products obviously exhibits 
this structure.  Economic analysis of distribution contracts between a 
manufacturer and distributor may be anticompetitive under certain conditions.  
Specifically, distribution contracts may successfully exclude rivals if a 
manufacturer with market power is able to achieve a sufficient share of 
distribution so that a manufacturer￿s rivals are forced to operate at a significant 
cost disadvantage for a significant period of time. 
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The share of distribution achieved by the manufacturer is often referred to 
in the antitrust literature as the level of foreclosure.  Typically, foreclosure is 
discussed in the context of exclusive dealing contracts by which a manufacturer 
binds a distributor to commit to promote and sell only the manufacturer￿s 
product.  However, the economic analysis can be applied more broadly to 
include distribution contracts that commit the distributor to a particular 
percentage of distribution or by which the manufacturer is able to create a de 
facto exclusive environment for rivals.   
If a manufacturer is able to contractually foreclose a sufficient share of 
distribution to rivals so that the remaining distribution cannot support a 
manufacturer of minimum efficient scale, anticompetitive effect may be achieved 
because existing competitors and potential entrants may be forced to operate at a 
cost disadvantage until sufficient additional distribution becomes available.  It is 
therefore possible that a manufacturer￿s distribution contracts may by 
exclusionary by driving out and/ or preventing entry of manufacturing 
competitors.   
Easy entry into distribution may prevent a manufacturer from 
successfully excluding rivals.  Where the supply of distribution services is highly 
elastic, it follows that a manufacturer cannot exclude its rivals from access to 
distribution.  If, for example, product manufacturers compete by obtaining 
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exclusive contracts, a new entrant would be forced to arrange for independent 
distribution.  Independent distribution may be arranged for either by switching 
to existing distributors at the expiration of the contract term or by contracting 
with new entrants into distribution.  Where entry into distribution is easy, it is 
highly unlikely that exclusive dealing contracts or contractual arrangements that 
otherwise foreclose rivals from distribution services could significantly deter 
entry. 
The analysis is altered slightly in the grocery store context where the 
retailer is a multi-product distributor.  The economic significance of this 
distinction is that the manufacturer￿s product is only a small fraction of the 
distributor￿s total sales.  Despite free entry into distribution, it is not likely to be 
economic for a product manufacturer to vertically integrate into distribution or 
for new distributors to serve rivals.  A manufacturer is left to contract for 
distribution with existing distributors. 
With this background, a number of conditions must be present in order 
for a set of distribution contracts to create or maintain manufacturer market 
power.  These conditions can be derived from considering the analogy of the 
distribution arrangements to a conspiracy among distributors organized by a 
dominant manufacturer.  In other words, the distributors and manufacturers 
work together to monopolize distribution or both distribution and 
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manufacturing and share the industry monopoly profits.29  By considering the 
incentives of an individual distributor to remain outside of the arrangement, like 
all cartels, it is not difficult to see the difficulties in successfully achieving 
anticompetitive exclusion. 
  This cartel analysis reveals that one requirement of a successful 
exclusionary strategy is that economies of scale must exist at the manufacturing 
level.  Consider the case where economies of scale in manufacturing are not 
significant.  An individual distributor has more to gain by remaining outside the 
conspiracy and contracting with a rival manufacturer.  A competitive 
manufacturer in this case can survive at a limited scale and therefore do not 
require a large number of distributors.  The cost to a manufacturer of blocking 
rivals from access to distribution and therefore creating or maintaining market 
power is very high.  Like the incentive to cheat on a collusive agreement by 
expanding sales, a distributor would find it more profitable to contract with a 
rival manufacturer. 
  Conversely, where there are significant economies of scale in 
manufacturing, the potential for a stable, exclusionary distribution arrangement 
increase.  A dominant manufacturer must cover enough distribution for a 
                                                 
29 This analysis has been shown to describe the role of Standard Oil in enforcing the collusively 




sufficient period of time so that a rival manufacturer is rendered unable to reach 
minimum efficient scale.  A rival forced to reduce scale as a result of the scarcity 
of distribution operates at higher average costs and is therefore less able to 
discipline a price increase by the dominant manufacturer. 
  Not all arrangements by a dominant manufacturer, which successfully 
cover a sufficient share of distribution where significant economies of scale are 
present in manufacturing, result in an anticompetitive effect.  Economies of scale 
in distribution play an important role in the economic analysis.  Consider the 
case of significant economies of scale in distribution.  In this case, an individual 
distributor can supply a manufacturer of minimum efficient scale and therefore, 
a dominant manufacturer would be forced to exclude a rival from each 
distributor in order to ensure that the rival was effectively excluded.  In other 
words, any rival would defeat this exclusionary tactic by winning a single 
distribution contract.  Even where contracts become available intermittently as a 
result of staggered expiration dates, it is unlikely that a manufacturer could 
exclude a competitive manufacturer from the market. 
5.2.  The Antitrust Law of Exclusionary Distribution Contracts 
The legal analysis of distribution contracts, including exclusive dealing 
contracts, is largely consistent with the economic analysis above.  However, legal 
analysis in monopolization cases can vary from sophisticated attempts at 
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understanding the probability of anticompetitive effect based on an examination 
of the necessary conditions set forth above to unjustified findings of 
anticompetitive effect based upon neither economic theory nor empirical 
verification.  This section summarizes modern monopolization jurisprudence 
with respect to distribution contracts, including exclusive dealing contracts, 
promotional arrangements, and distribution contracts that otherwise 
disadvantage rivals. 
The paradigmatic standard under Section 2 of the Sherman Act was set 
forth by the United States Supreme Court in Grinnell:30 
The offense of monopoly under Section 2 of the Sherman Act has two 
elements: (1) the possession of monopoly power in the relevant market 
and (2) the willful acquisition or maintenance of that power as 
distinguished from growth or development as a consequence of a superior 
product, business acumen, or historic accident. 
The Grinnell standard stands as the classic formulation of monopolization 
analysis and was recently relied on by the Supreme Court in Kodak.31  Both the 
                                                 
30 United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1966). 
31  Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 481 (1992). 
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monopoly power element and the ￿conduct￿ element of the Grinnell standard 
have proven difficult to apply for district and appellate courts.32   
A. Manufacturer  Monopoly  Power 
As Timothy Muris has written, the monopoly power element necessarily 
requires economic analysis because that power is defined as the ability to raise 
the industry price and restrict industry output.33  A firm without monopoly 
power does not have the ability to create competitive harm and cannot exclude 
rivals without a collusive agreement or by conduct such as obtaining a patent by 
fraud or destroying a rival￿s product.  Collusion is adequately handled under the 
price-fixing provisions of Sherman Act § 1, while fraud, disparagement and 
product destruction are regulated by other laws.  For a firm to successfully 
exclude rivals, these anomalies aside, it must have monopoly power.  
Recent decisions have inferred this level of monopoly power from 
observations of market shares in the relevant market ranging from 50 percent to 
                                                 
32 See Einer Elhauge, Defining Better Monopolization Standards, 56 Stan. L. Rev. 253, 258-268 
(2003), for a critique of the currently uncertain standards on the grounds that the elements prove 
prohibitively difficult to administer and do not provide meaningful guidance to courts and juries. 
33 See Timothy J. Muris, The FTC and the Law of Monopolization, 67 Antitrust Law Journal 693 
(2000).  Note that the term ￿market power￿ as I will use in this paper, and as it is used in most 
antitrust decisions, refers to monopoly power ￿ the power to restrict market output or increase 
the market price.  Market power, in the economic sense, is quite a different phenomenon rooted 
in the downward sloping demand curves that are not perfectly elastic, and therefore give the firm 
a modicum of pricing discretion but not the ability to affect the market price.  See Benjamin Klein 
& John Wiley, Jr., Competitive Price Discrimination as an Antitrust Justification for Intellectual 
Property Refusals to Deal, 70 Antitrust Law Journal 599 (2003). 
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70 percent.34  The paradigmatic market share guideline for monopoly power has 
been that shares less than 33 percent are not sufficient, shares greater than 
90percent are sufficient, and shares between 50-70 percent might be sufficient.35 
B.  Bad Conduct and Substantial Foreclosure 
One reading of the ￿conduct￿ element of the Grinnell test has been that the 
monopolist￿s conduct is not actionable unless it is ￿anticompetitive or 
exclusionary.￿  The Aspen Court defined ￿anticompetitive or exclusionary￿ 
behavior as that which ￿tends to impair the opportunities or rivals, but also 
either does not further competition on the merits or does so in an unnecessarily 
restrictive way.￿36  Economic analysis indicates that without foreclosure of a 
rival￿s access to distribution, a monopolist￿s contracts with distributors cannot 
satisfy this definition and create or maintain monopoly power. 
Analysis of sufficient foreclosure of the relevant market has been at the 
heart of vertical restraint analysis in antitrust cases for decades.37  Standard 
                                                 
34 See Posner, Antitrust Law at 196 n. 6 and the cases cited therein for a sense of the range of 
market share thresholds across the appellate circuits. 
35 See Eastman Kodak, 504 U.S. at 481 (80-95percent is sufficient to survive summary judgment); 
Grinnell, 384 U.S. at 571 (￿In the present case, 87 percent [market share] leaves no doubt that . . . 
defendants have monopoly power . . . if that business is the relevant market￿). 
36 Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 595-96 n. 32 (quoting the 
formulation in III Phillip Areeda & Donald F. Turner, Antitrust Law: An Analysis of Antitrust 
Principles and Their Application 78 (1978)). 
37 The Supreme Court￿s last exclusive dealing case, Tampa Electric v. Nashville Coal Co., 365 U.S. 
320 (1960), concluded that an exclusive dealing contract covering less than one percent of the 
relevant distribution market was not a violation of the antitrust laws. 
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Fashion and Standard Stations found antitrust liability for foreclosure levels of 40 
and 49 percent, respectively.38  However, several courts of lower federal courts 
have granted antitrust liability for lesser levels of foreclosure.39  In the tying 
context, Jefferson Parish has established that foreclosure levels of less than 30 
percent are not sufficient for liability.40 
The economic analysis above implies that the critical level of foreclosure 
should depend upon the minimum efficient scale of production.  Unless there are 
large economies of scale in manufacturing, the minimum level of foreclosure 
necessary for an anticompetitive effect in most cases would be substantially 
greater than 40 percent.  Therefore, a 40 percent share of distribution can be 
thought of as a useful screening device or ￿safe harbor,￿ rather than an 
indication that anticompetitive effects are likely to exist at distribution shares 
exceeding this level.  Nonetheless, modern antitrust law continues to require 
sufficient foreclosure in order for antitrust liability to follow.   
                                                 
38 Standard Fashion Co. v. Magrane-Houston Co., 258 U.S. 346 (1922); Standard Oil Co. v. United 
States, 337 U.S. 293 (1949). 
39 See Jonathan M. Jacobsen, Exclusive Dealing, ￿Foreclosure,￿ and Consumer Harm, 70 
ANTITRUST L. J. 311, 362 (2002).  Jacobsen describes the state of the foreclosure requirement in 
exclusive dealing since Beltone Electronics Corp., 100 F.T.C. 68 (1982), as generally condoning 
arrangements with foreclosure percentages of 40percent or less.  Id. at 325.  Jacobsen 
characterizes exclusive dealing law as requiring only that the exclusive dealing arrangement have 
a significant impact on the defendant￿s market power, and not necessarily sufficient foreclosure.  
However, the defendant￿s market power cannot be affected without sufficient foreclosure. 
40 Jefferson Parish Hospital District No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2 (1984). 
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However, analysis of foreclosure in distribution markets raises at least 
two interesting problems.  One considers the appropriate market definition at the 
distribution level, i.e. whether a significant share of the most cost-effective 
distribution channels but not of total distribution, should be sufficient for a 
finding of the requisite foreclosure.  The second issue is specific to foreclosure of 
shelf space and involves the use of the ￿shelf space to sales doctrine￿ which 
essentially finds the requisite level of foreclosure where a manufacturer￿s share 
of distribution exceeds its product market share. 
1.  Foreclosure of Cost-Effective Distribution Channels 
Rather than calculating the percentage of total distribution bound by the 
manufacturer￿s contracts, courts have found the foreclosure requirement satisfied 
in situations where the foreclosure of total distribution would be insufficient, but 
the manufacturer has foreclosed a significant share of a particular type of 
distribution channel.  The underlying conflict among the circuit courts is 
exemplified by comparing the D.C. Circuit￿s ruling in Microsoft with the Ninth 
Circuit￿s analysis in Gilbarco.41 
The district court￿s analysis in Microsoft concluded that Microsoft￿s de 
facto exclusive distribution contracts with Internet access providers and personal 
                                                 
41 United States v. Microsoft Corp., 87 F. Supp. 2d 30 (D.D.C. 2000) rev￿d in part, aff￿d in part, 
Microsoft Corp. v. United States, 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001)(en banc), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 952 
(2001); Omega v. Gilbarco, 127 F. 3d 1157 (9th Cir. 1997). 
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computer manufacturers did not violate Section 1 because it found that the 
contracts did not cover more than 40 percent of distribution.42  The D.C. Circuit 
noted its disagreement with the decision, but did not reverse the ruling which 
was not challenged by the plaintiffs. 
Interestingly, the D.C. Circuit fully accepted the district court￿s conclusion 
that the same contracts violated Section 2 because they permitted Microsoft to 
control a substantial share of the browser market in an attempt to illegally 
maintain Window￿s dominance in the operating system market.43  One potential 
reading of these conflicting holdings is that Section 2 is more restrictive than 
Section 1.  Such an interpretation is counter-intuitive and does not take into 
account the D.C. Circuit￿s consideration of the ￿cost-effectiveness￿ of the 
different distribution channels.  The D.C. Circuit, by explicitly placing greater 
weight on Microsoft￿s share of cost-effective browser distribution, found that 
Microsoft￿s share exceeded 40 percent.  This interpretation suggests a consistent 
minimum foreclosure standard under Sections 1 and 2.44 
The Ninth Circuit￿s analysis in Gilbarco rejected the notion that Gilbarco￿s 
success in its attempt to procure the most efficient distributors was actionable 
under the antitrust laws.  Gilbarco was a Clayton §3 case brought by plaintiff 
                                                 
42 87 F. Supp. 2d at 52. 
43 253 F.3d at 70-71. 
44 This point is consistent with Benjamin Klein￿s prior analysis, supra note 15. 
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Omega Environmental, Inc.  The defendant, Gilbarco Co., was a manufacturer of 
petroleum dispensing equipment who sold their products both directly and 
through authorized dealers to the owners of retail gasoline outlets and other 
purchasers of such equipment.45  Gilbarco was the market leader, capturing 
nearly 55% of the domestic market for dispensers in 1995.46   
Manufacturers of petroleum dispensing equipment distribute their 
products through a number of channels.  Gilbarco for example, sold 
approximately one-third of its sales directly to end users while the remaining 
dispensers are sold through authorized distributors.47  Other distributors focus 
primarily on major oil companies and jobbers.48 
Omega proposed to enter the industry by providing ￿one-stop shopping￿ 
to consumers of petroleum dispensers.  Its plan was to develop a national service 
and distribution network by purchasing existing concerns, and allowing Omega 
distributors to offer multiple product lines.49  Omega, as part of this plan, 
purchased two Gilbarco authorized distributors.50  Gilbarco quickly notified the 
newly acquired Omega distributors under contract to Gilbarco that it ￿intended 
                                                 
45 Id. at 1160. 
46 Id. 
47 Id. 
48 Dresser Wayne, the second leading dispenser manufacturer, for example, sold 70% of its 
dispensers directly to the major oil companies and jobbers.  Id. 
49 Id. 
50 Omega purchased ATS-Omega and Kelley-Omega.  Id. 
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to continue to do business with service station equipment distributors who sell 
only the Gilbarco line of retail dispensers.￿51  Gilbarco subsequently gave its 
contractually required 60 days notice and terminated the agreement.  Omega 
promptly sued upon termination and won a $9,000,000 award which was trebled 
to $27,000,000 on the basis of a number of claims including an exclusive dealing 
claim under the Clayton Act.52 
The court then moves on to analyze the potential anticompetitive effect 
caused by Gilbarco￿s distribution arrangements.  The relevant market was 
defined as ￿the sale of retail gasoline dispensers from manufacturers in the 
United States.￿53  The Ninth Circuit majority￿s algebra indicates the Gilbarco￿s 
exclusive dealing arrangements cover 38 percent of the market for distribution.54   
Despite the relatively significant percentage of distribution foreclosed, 
Judge Wright describes the 38 percent figure as an ￿overstatement￿ of the ￿size 
of foreclosure and its likely anticompetitive effect for several reasons.￿55  Judge 
Wright concluded that the evidence of foreclosure was legally insufficient 
because alternative means of distribution were present, such as direct sales to 
                                                 
51 Id. at 1161.  Because Gilbarco controls 55 percent of the total market, and 70 percent of its sales 
are through exclusive dealing arrangements with authorized distributors, the product of these 
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end-users.  Because of the existence of these alternative means of distribution 
eliminate the potential danger of Gilbarco￿s exclusive arrangements in the 
authorized dealer channel. 
Significantly, Omega contended that even if the percentage foreclosed was 
not legally sufficient, the fact that Gilbarco had tied up the ￿best available￿ 
distribution options and those distributors were highly unlikely to depart from 
contractual relations with market-leader Gilbarco for a competitor.  The majority 
rejected the notion that Gilbarco￿s success in its attempt to procure the most 
efficient distributors was actionable under the antitrust laws.  In particular, the 
panel majority considered Gilbarco￿s significant share of the cost-effective 
distribution channels indicative of Gilbarco￿s superiority.56 
Microsoft and Gilbarco provide a contrast of the analysis applied in 
different federal circuits with respect to foreclosure of distribution.  The 
economic analysis suggests that the key inquiry is an examination of whether the 
defendant￿s conduct has prevented a rival from attaining minimum efficient 
scale.  Where economies of scale are present, it therefore seems appropriate to 
give greater weight to the most effective distribution channels if a rival is 
unlikely to be able to attain minimum efficient scale without access to those 
channels.  The non-uniformity of foreclosure analysis on this issue, however, 
                                                 
56 Id. at 1163. 
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imposes a significant degree of uncertainty regarding antitrust liability on 
manufacturers with monopoly power and their competitive strategies for 
product distribution. 
2.  Shelf Space to Sales Ratio 
In cases involving distribution via shelf space, some district courts have 
determined that the proper foreclosure percentage can be measured by a handy 
approximation that has been termed the ￿space to sales￿ ratio.  The space to sales 
doctrine asserts that a manufacturer whose percentage of shelf space is greater 
than its product market share achieved sufficient foreclosure.57 
Use of the ￿space to sales￿ ratio substitutes a less sophisticated and less 
accurate analysis, although substantially more convenient, for the level of rigor 
required to assess the true likelihood of an anticompetitive effect.  An inference 
                                                 
57 This practice likely began as a result of the FTC investigation of ready-to-eat cereals.  See 
Kellogg Co., 99 FTC 8 (1982).  Factual findings 460 and 461 in that case supported ￿space to 
sales,￿ or allocation of shelf space in proportion to market share as a method that ￿ensured that 
the retailers would avoid out-of-stocks and overstocks, increase efficiency and profitability and 
reduce labor costs.￿  Findings of fact, ¶ 460.  The findings of fact also stated that ￿sales volume is, 
and has been, the basic method of space allocation throughout grocery stores.￿ Id. at 461.  
Subsequent federal courts have used this ￿space to sales￿ rule as a guideline in slotting fee 
monopolization cases.  Firms that do not obtain a percentage of shelf space greater than their 
respective market share are likely to be found not to violate antitrust laws.  See Frito Lay, Inc.  v. 
Bachman Company, 659 F. Supp. 1129,1134 (S.D.N.Y. 1986)(dismissing Section 1 claim due to 
failure to allege that Frito Lay obtained a greater share of shelf space than its market share);  
Bayou Bottling v. Dr. Pepper, 725 F. 2d 300, 303 (5th Cir. 1985)(using the ￿space to sales￿ 
guideline to reject a monopolization claim).  In a more recent case, El Aguila Food Products Inc. 
v. Gruma Co., 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24411, the district court rejected claims that Gruma had 
excluded plaintiff tortilla manufacturers from shelf space and harmed competition partially on 
the grounds that Gruma￿s shelf space was not disproportionate to sales.  Id. at *52 (citing Louisa 
Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Pepsi Cola Metro Bottling Co., 94 F. Supp. 2d 804, 814-15 (E.D. Ky. 
1999)).   
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of competitive injury cannot be made simply because one firm has obtained a 
share of shelf space distribution that exceeds its market share.  There is no sound 
economic basis for the ￿space to sales￿ ratio. 
The key economic question of foreclosure is whether or not rivals are 
prevented from reaching minimum efficient scale.  The answer to this question is 
likely to require in-depth knowledge of the cost conditions of the industry, which 
will obviously vary and necessitate a ￿hands on￿ analysis of the facts.  In 
particular, the level of foreclosure necessary for anticompetitive effect is 
dependent on the magnitude of scale economies in manufacture.  A rule of 
thumb such as ￿space to sales￿ may surely be a useful tool for retailers deciding 
how to allocate shelf space, but it is misguiding as a tool for antitrust analysis. 
C.  Duration and Terminability of Contract 
The economic importance of the duration of the contract is that under a 
longer contract, a manufacturer seeking distribution of its product may not be 
able to find efficient channels for distribution and therefore may be deterred 
from entry for a significant period of time.  The delay of entry may cause 
anticompetitive injury while rival manufacturers look to realign with new 
entrants.  Under a shorter contract, a manufacturer need only time its entry such 
that sufficient distribution is available for the manufacturer upon the expiration 
of the exclusive term.   
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However, even under exclusive contracts that are terminable at will, 
achieving sufficient distribution to achieve minimum efficient scale may be 
postponed if a large number of distributors cannot be convinced to terminate 
their contracts.   Because of the staggered expiration dates of shorter term 
exclusive contracts, a potential entrant may take longer to reach minimum 
efficient scale and therefore will operate at higher costs for a period of time if 
economies of scale exist in the industry. 
Antitrust law incorporates the economic significance of the distribution 
contract￿s duration.  The length of exclusive contract has been a primary 
emphasis of antitrust law when dealing with Sherman Act §2 and Clayton Act §3 
cases.  In some cases, courts have found that the length of exclusion is a 
dispositive factor in the analysis.  For example, Judge Posner held that 
arrangements lasting less than one year would be ￿presumptively lawful.￿58  
Much like the degree of the market foreclosed in terms of market share, many 
courts have subsequently focused on the duration of the exclusivity clause in the 
challenged contract.  Some have followed Roland Machinery￿s analysis, while 
others have found that even short term contracts could potentially cause 
competitive harm where contracts were in fact, difficult to terminate.59 
                                                 
58 Roland Mach. Co. v. Dresser Indus., Inc., 749 F.2d 380, 395 (7th Cir. 1984). 
59 The Ninth Circuit majority in Gilbarco found that the fact that ￿all of Gilbarco￿s distributors are 
available within one year, and most available on 60 days notice,￿ showed that competitors need 
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The economics of category management indicate that it is a less restrictive 
means of facilitating a manufacturer￿s compensation arrangement with 
distributors than exclusive dealing.  It follows that the standard applied to a 
category manager￿s distribution arrangement should be more lenient than that 
applied to dominant manufacturers obtaining exclusives from distributors.  
Interestingly, this has not necessarily been so.  At least one court has applied a 
more stringent standard to category manager conduct on the theory that the 
category management relationship imposes a type of fiduciary obligation 
running from the manager to the retailer and perhaps the consumer. 
5.3.  Conwood Co. v. United States Tobacco Co.60 
The Sixth Circuit recently increased the risk of antitrust exposure to 
dominant firms entering distribution contracts when it affirmed a verdict of 
illegal monopolization under Sherman Act §2.  The verdict, trebled from $350 
                                                                                                                                                
simply offer a better deal in order to persuade distributors to switch their allegiance.  In an 
informative citation, the court refers to Judge Posner￿s holding in Roland Machinery, where the 
￿short duration and easy terminability of these agreements negates substantially their potential 
to foreclose competition.￿  127 F.3d at 1163.  Other recent cases have concluded that foreclosure 
occurred despite the fact that the contracts were terminable at will and of short duration because 
the contracts were difficult to terminate as a practical matter.  See, e.g., United States v. Dentsply 
Inc., 2001-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) ¶ 73, 247 (D. Del. 2001); Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Appleton 
Papers, Inc., 35 F. Supp. 2d 1138, 1144 (D. Minn 1999). 
60 290 F.3d 768 (6th Cir. 2002). 
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million to $1.05 billion dollars in damages, is the second largest in antitrust 
history.61   
A brief discussion of the moist snuff market and facts offered at trial 
regarding the competitive conditions in the market is offered first as a predicate 
to understanding the shortcomings of the Sixth Circuit￿s decision, as well as to 
provide the building blocks for understanding the high probability that USTC￿s 
conduct could not produce the anticompetitive effect that is requisite to a 
Sherman Act violation. 
USTC was the leading manufacturer in the U.S. moist snuff market.  USTC 
held approximately a 77% market share while Conwood, the plaintiff, held 
approximately 13%.62  USTC manufactures the ￿Skoal￿ and ￿Copenhagen￿ 
brands while of moist snuff while Conwood manufactures the ￿Kodiak￿ and 
￿Cougar￿ brands.63  USTC dominated the market for most of the 1970s and 80s.  
The 90s exhibited increased entry in the market and a decrease in market share 
for USTC while the company imposed price increases of approximately 8-10% 
annually from 1979-88.64 
                                                 
61 See David A. Balto, ￿Sixth Circuit Upholds One Billion Dollar Antitrust Jury Verdict: Posing 
Significant Risks for Dominant Firms,￿ White & Case LLP. 
62 290 F. 3d at 774. 
63 Id. at 773. 
64 Id. at 774. 
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The Sixth Circuit opinion also emphasized a number of facts.  First, the 
court emphasized the importance of in-store advertising and ￿point of sale￿ 
(POS) in the moist snuff market due to restrictions on tobacco advertising.65  
Second, USTC￿s strategy during the 1990s began to involve pursuing ￿exclusive 
racks.￿  Despite the label, an ￿exclusive rack￿ refers to one manufacturer 
supplying a rack to the retailer to display its moist snuff products and those of all 
other manufacturers.66  An exclusive rack essentially means that the 
manufacturer with the benefit of exclusivity may design allocation of moist snuff 
products on the rack pending approval of the retailer.67  However, the 
monopolization charges in the Conwood case did not revolve simply around 
USTC￿s attempt to obtain exclusive racks at a number of retailers.   
Perhaps the most unique and troubling allegations in the Conwood case 
were that USTC removed competitors￿ product display racks from stores without 
the permission of the store management, destroyed these racks in some cases, 
trained its salespeople to take advantage of inattentive store clerks in an effort to 
destroy Conwood racks, and misused its category management position by 
                                                 
65 Id. at 774. 
66 Id. at 775. 
67 The court also made reference to the fact that some retailers requested exclusive racks citing 
￿uniformity￿ and ￿attractiveness￿ as benefits.  It also pointed out that Wal-Mart and other 
retailers often hosted competitions amongst moist snuff manufacturers to design a rack for use in 
its stores.  USTC argued to the court that Conwood had access to those competitions and chose 
not to compete in some cases.  Id. 
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falsely informing and misleading retailers in order to maximize distribution of 
USTC product.68   
At trial, Conwood was able to provide evidence supporting its claim that 
in some cases, USTC salespersons had removed the Conwood display racks 
without authorization.69  In addition, USTC employees testified that they had 
orders from supervisors to destroy Conwood racks, and in some cases, employee 
compensation and bonuses depended on such rack destruction.70  After an 
extensive trial, the district court jury deliberated for only four hours and 
returned the $350 million verdict in Conwood￿s favor.71 
The Sixth Circuit￿s analysis applied the Sherman Act §2 standard in the 
context of the reviewing the district court￿s denial of a motion for judgment as a 
matter of law.  The appellate issues are therefore analyzed under the premise 
that all evidentiary issues are viewed in the light most favorable to Conwood.72  
                                                 
68 Id. at 778-79. 
69 Id. at 777.  Conwood representatives testified that it spent near $100,000 a month on 
replacement racks.  Other evidence included claims by former USTC employees that those 
employees frequently removed competitor racks over a period of time. 
70 Id. at 780. 
71 Id. at 773. 
72 Id. at 781 (citing Williams v. Nashville Network, 132 F. 3d 1123, 1131 (6th Cir. 1997) (citing K & T 
Enterprises, Inc. v. Zurich Ins. Co., 97 F.3d 171 (6th Cir. 1996))). 
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Therefore, the Sixth Circuit was to grant the motion only if ￿reasonable minds 
could not come to a conclusion other than one favoring the movant.￿73 
USTC raised three major objections to the district court￿s decision.  USTC￿s 
primary argument was that its conduct was at most, ￿no more than isolated 
sporadic torts￿74 rather than antitrust violations.  Further, USTC argued that 
Conwood failed to show sufficient foreclosure from the market for shelf space, 
and also that Conwood had not established a causal link between any of USTC￿s 
business practices and antitrust injury.75 
With respect to USTC￿s argument that its practices were business torts as 
opposed to Sherman Act violations, the Sixth Circuit noted that although 
business torts alone are only violative of Sherman Act §2 in ￿gross cases,￿76 the 
fact that a business practice supports a tort cause of action does not prevent 
action under the antitrust laws if competitive injury has occurred.  The key 
question for the court￿s analysis was whether or not ￿anticompetitive conduct￿ 
had occurred.77   
                                                 
73 Id. 
74 Id. at 783. 
75 Id. at 787 n.4. 
76 See 3A Areeda & Turner, Antitrust Law, P782(a), at 272. 
77 The court also held that the burden of proof would not be on Conwood to show with great 
detail the specific establishments at which the alleged behavior had taken place.  The Court found 
Conwood￿s showing sufficient to support a conclusion that the acts were widespread. 
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The district court instructed the jury that ￿USTC could not be held liable 
for conduct that was part of the normal competitive process.￿78  However, the 
court was clearly convinced that the nature of USTC￿s conduct was outside of 
that justifiable by the normal competitive process for distribution.  USTC￿s claim 
that Conwood had failed to show sufficient foreclosure as required by the line of 
cases challenging exclusive dealing arrangements under Sherman Act §2 or 
Clayton Act §3 failed because the court distinguished the conduct in Conwood as 
unique due to USTC￿s position as category manager and the egregious nature of 
the product destruction allegations.79  Specifically, the Sixth Circuit￿s analysis 
stated that ￿Conwood￿s claim is broader than merely challenging the exclusive 
arrangements USTC entered into with retailers for exclusive racks.￿80  In this 
light, it seems that the Court found USTC￿s conduct especially suspicious due to 
USTC￿s relationship with retailers as the category manager.  Specifically, the 
court points to evidence that ￿USTC used its position as category manager to 
exclude competition by suggesting that retailers carry fewer products, 
particularly competitor￿s products; by attempting to control the number of price 
                                                 
78 Id. at 787 n.4.  The Court attempts to distinguish USTC￿s behavior from that appearing in the 
line of exclusive dealing cases cited by USTC because of USTC￿s destruction of Conwood￿s racks 
and misrepresentations; all which the court clearly connects to USTC￿s position as category 
manager. 
79 Id. 
80 Id. at 787. 
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value brands introduced in stores; and by suggesting that stores carry its slower 
moving products instead of better selling competitor products.￿81 
Finally, the court emphasized evidence of damages to Conwood.  USTC 
argued that evidence showing an increase in the number of moist snuff brands 
during the 1990s, market expansion, an increase in Conwood market share and 
retailers￿ independent decisions not to display Conwood￿s rack and POS 
advertising were alternate causes of Conwood￿s injury.82  However, the court was 
not persuaded by USTC￿s evidence, citing Brooke Group for the proposition that 
in the face of evidence indicating market expansion and competitive conditions, 
the ultimate issue is whether the market would have been even more competitive 
without the conduct at issue.83   
Analyzing the facts in the light most favorable to Conwood, the court 
found that the jury￿s conclusion that competition suffered during the time period 
was reasonable.  Based upon evidence from Conwood￿s expert, Dr. Leftwich, 
showing that a statistically significant relationship existed between Conwood￿s 
market share in those states where Conwood enjoyed a foothold and those in 
                                                 
81 Id. at 787. 
82 Id. at 788. 




which it did not, the jury agreed with the testimony and awarded damages 
within Leftwich￿s range of estimates varying between $313 and $488 million.84 
Despite the Sixth Circuit￿s own recognition that courts rarely find antitrust 
liability on business torts alone, and the reaffirmation of that teaching in Brooke 
Group,85 the decision stands as a warning to firms that antitrust liability may be 
substitutable for business tort liability in cases of product distribution.  Whether 
or not the Sixth Circuit was correct with respect to its conclusion that competitive 
harm had occurred, an issue to be taken up in the next section, several points 
should be made regarding flaws in the analysis itself. 
First, Conwood lowers the bar facing antitrust plaintiffs alleging 
competitive harm resulting from abuse of the category manager relationship.  
The economic analysis of category manager contracts discussed above suggests 
that category management is less restrictive than granting a manufacturer an 
exclusive right to the retailer￿s shelf space.  It follows that the antitrust standard 
to be applied to category managers should be weaker than that applied to 
exclusive dealing contracts.  However, the Conwood decision appears to place 
                                                 
84 Id. at 795.  For a critical examination Dr. Leftwich￿s analysis and its flaws, see David Kaye, The 
Dynamics of Daubert Methodology, Conclusions, and Statistical Fit in Econometric Studies, 87 U. 
Va. L. Rev. 1933 (2001). 
85 Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 225 (1993).  ￿Even an 
act of pure malice by one business competitor against another does not, without more, state a 
claim under the federal antitrust laws; those laws do not create a federal law of unfair 
competition or ￿purport to afford remedies for all torts committed by or against persons in 
interstate commerce.￿ 
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great weight on the fact that USTC￿s conduct was an ￿abuse￿ of its category 
management position.  In fact, the Sixth Circuit specifically speaks of ￿the 
manner in which it used its position as a monopolist providing category 
management services, i.e. to exclude [competitors] from competition.￿86 
A separate analytical flaw is that Conwood does away with the 
requirement of a showing of substantial foreclosure.  There is no doubt that a 
category management arrangement, like an exclusive dealing contract, may 
produce an anticompetitive result under certain conditions.  As discussed above, 
monopolization law generally, and exclusive dealing analysis specifically, 
require a showing of anticompetitive effect as a prerequisite for antitrust liability.  
Conwood forgoes the accepted analysis of allegedly exclusionary agreements.  
This flaw is especially suspicious because it is likely that the application of this 
accepted analysis, incorporating substantial foreclosure, would have changed the 
result in Conwood as the evidence is scant on the issue of substantial foreclosure 
of a critical resource, a predicate factual finding of anticompetitive effect.   
Third, Conwood emphasizes the possible link between a manufacturers￿ 
position as category manager and the product destruction that took place.87  
There is no doubt that Conwood differs from traditional monopolization cases as a 
                                                 
86 Id. at 787. 
87 Id. at 787 n.4. 
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result of the product destruction element of the antitrust claims.  However, the 
suggestion that a systematic link exists between category management and 
product destruction is not supported.  To the contrary, the analysis in Section 4 
suggests that a self-enforcing mechanism whereby a retailer could terminate a 
manager abusing its position would protect retailers against such abuses of the 
category manager designation.   
One question that might be raised by the Conwood decision is whether or 
not accepted antitrust analysis in monopolization cases analyzing the percentage 
of the market foreclosed, entry conditions, duration of contract and other 
competitive conditions is properly applicable to cases where the conduct 
involves instances of egregious conduct such as product destruction, which does 
not have any offsetting price or quality benefits, nor efficiency enhancing 
properties.  From an economic standpoint, the crucial question is whether or not 
the defendant￿s conduct, whether it falls inside or outside any court-made 
boundaries of ￿meritorious￿ competition, is sufficient to exclude rivals.  The 
economic analysis of that conduct is not dependent on the court-perceived merit 
of the conduct where both parties have access to the competitive process.  
Product destruction cases, then, seem to fall within the more general framework 
of exclusionary analysis without modification.  Therefore, the argument that a 
different standard should be applied to product destruction cases is not 
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persuasive.88  Perhaps Conwood￿s emphasis of product destruction will ultimately 
limit the application of its flawed analysis to cases including equally egregious 
allegations.  However, no such limitation currently exists in an area of law where 
guiding precedent is particularly scarce. 
5.4.  USTC￿s Conduct Was Unlikely to Cause Any Anticompetitive 
Effect 
The economic analysis of category management suggests that category 
management is a method used by manufacturers and retailers to facilitate 
contracts governing the retailer￿s supply of promotional effort.  This analysis has 
nothing to do with the anticompetitive foreclosure of rivals.  However, a 
manufacturer may be able to increase barriers to entry and exclude rivals by 
prohibiting them from access to shelf space sufficient to compete at minimum 
efficient scale, thereby increasing its own market power under certain conditions. 
Unfortunately, the Sixth Circuit did not engage in a full analysis of the 
likelihood of competitive harm.  The truncated analysis appears to be linked to 
USTC￿s position as a category manager and its egregious conduct, including 
product destruction and deception.  When combined with the weak evidence of 
anticompetitive impact submitted by Dr. Leftwich, sufficient evidence was found 
to support a finding of antitrust liability.  However, the necessary conditions for 
                                                 
88 Additionally, the ability of the plaintiff to seek business tort remedies militates against any 
argument for changing the standard. 
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such an exclusionary strategy to result in anticompetitive impact are sufficient to 
assess anticompetitive effect without reliance on subjective notions of the 
severity, or irregularity of USTC￿s conduct relative to the normal competitive 
process.  
Category captains are typically firms with significant market share in the 
industry.89  Under certain conditions, a dominant firm may be able to engage in 
behavior that excludes rivals and also injures competition.  Specifically, a 
dominant manufacturer may foreclose competing manufacturers and potential 
entrants by tying up a sufficient mass of a critical input through contractual 
arrangements such that the manufacturer or potential entrant is unable to 
achieve minimum efficient scale.  Therefore, the monopolization analysis is 
identical to that of a dominant firm entering into exclusive agreements with 
retailers or other distributors.   
First, market power is a necessary condition for competitive harm to 
occur.  Market power was not a disputed fact in the case as USTC had 
approximated 77% of the moist snuff sales in the national market.90 
Second, the dominant firm must sufficiently foreclose shelf-space or access 
to product distribution in order for antitrust injury to occur.  In this case, both the 
                                                 
89 FTC Report at 51. 
 
90 290 F.3d at 774. 
Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press 
  58
district court and the Sixth Circuit eschewed such analysis in favor of anecdotal 
evidence of the widespread impact of USTC￿s more egregious rack-destroying 
and misleading behavior.  However, USTC did present evidence that less than 
10% of all stores carried USTC racks exclusively.91  Additionally, USTC presented 
evidence that Conwood was in 81% of all retail stores offering moist snuff 
products.92  Availability in 81% of the relevant retail stores suggests that 
Conwood was not sufficiently foreclosed such that it could not achieve minimum 
efficient scale. 
There was also evidence that a USTC discount program for retailers 
granting USTC preferred space on the shelves and participating in USTC 
promotions was able to sign 37,000 retailers, representing 80% of the moist snuff 
sales.93  The evidence does not show that Conwood was unable to offer similar 
discounts to retailers, nor that Conwood was foreclosed from obtaining shelf 
space for its own products.  To the contrary, evidence presented by USTC 
indicates that in some stores offering exclusivity to USTC, such as Wal-Mart, 
Conwood failed to participate in the plan-o-gram competition offered by the 
retailer.94  Therefore, while the record is unclear as to the exact percentage of 
                                                 
91 Id. at 775. 
92 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, at 19. 
93 Id. at 778. 
94 Id. at 775 n1. 
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shelf space foreclosed by USTC exclusive rack situations, the 10 percent 
presented by USTC and undisputed by Conwood is far less than the requisite 
foreclosure percentage in Sherman Act Section 2 and Clayton Act Section 3 cases.  
However, the 10 percent figure only symbolizes the level of foreclosure resulting 
from USTC￿s contractual arrangement.  This does not tell the entire story. 
The 10 percent foreclosure figure does not account for USTC￿s product 
destruction and removal.  The relevant antitrust question is whether USTC￿s 
conduct, contractual and otherwise, was sufficient to prohibit Conwood from 
operating at minimum efficient scale.  To the extent that USTC￿s product 
destruction tactics and deception foreclosed Conwood￿s ability to distribute 
product, that foreclosure should also be included in the analysis. 
Evidence suggests that Conwood￿s costs were increased by up to $100,000 
a month in replacing product.95  The procedural stance of the case required the 
court to construe the evidence in the light most favorable to Conwood because 
this claim of $100,000 monthly for replaced racks went unchallenged at trial by 
USTC.96  There is very little evidence supporting or refuting a conclusion that 
that this $100,000 monthly figure was sufficient to raise Conwood￿s costs to a 
level that they could not operate at minimum efficient scale.  The figure 
                                                 
95 290 F.3d at 778.  Conwood’s Chairman, William Rosson, testified that about 50% of the sales 
representatives￿ staff time was spend repairing destroyed racks.  Id. 
96 Id. at 785. 
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apparently represents about 20,000 racks per month.  The important analytical 
point is that the economic analysis of competitive harm for typical 
monopolization cases is well-suited to this analysis and substitution towards a 
less sophisticated framework is not necessary when cases involve allegations of 
product destruction or other tortious behavior.97 
Third, economies of scale or scope at the manufacturing level are a 
necessary condition for competitive harm.  USTC argued that its goal in 
attempting to increase distribution of its product was to take advantage of scale 
economies in the manufacture of moist snuff tobacco.98  While this is a mild 
concession by USTC, it is unclear how important scale economies are to moist 
snuff manufacture from the record.  The key economic question is the degree to 
which a decrease in quantity supplied by Conwood would increase Conwood￿s 
costs.  Without economies of scale, a reduction in scale would not increase 
Conwood￿s variable costs and therefore would leave rivals￿ abilities to discipline 
USTC￿s attempts to price increases unaffected. 
                                                 
97 Conflating elements of the tortious conduct into antitrust analysis does prove problematic in 
some respects.  For example, without application of traditional monopolization analysis, tortious 
conduct such as destruction of a manufacturer￿s plant by a dominant manufacturer would 
become an antitrust violation.  Clearly, regulation of such conduct is better handled by tort law 
and access to the prospect of punitive damages. 
 
98 Id. at 787 n.4. 
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Finally, although entry conditions at the retail level were scarcely 
analyzed by the district court or the Sixth Circuit, it is an important economic 
point that competitive harm may not occur if entry at the retail level is easy.  
Without barriers to entry at the retail level, disadvantaged suppliers may realign 
supply contracts with new entrants.  Because the distribution level in Conwood 
consists primarily of grocery retailers, and includes stores like Wal-Mart and gas 
stations, it is highly unlikely that any significant barriers to entry exist.  Retail is 
an intensely competitive industry in the United States with very thin margins 
and intense price and non-price competition.99   
While entry is not necessarily instantaneous, the amount of shelf space 
foreclosed is obviously a decreasing function of the ease of entry.  Any attempt to 
foreclose a sufficient amount of shelf space to make the supply of such space 
profitable through entry into the market will increase the amount of shelf space 
in the market and therefore decrease the percentage foreclosed.  If entry 
conditions were not difficult, the likelihood that USTC￿s conduct caused 
competitive harm is low. 
                                                 
99 See Joshua Wright, Von￿s Grocery and the Concentration-Price Relationship in Grocery Retail, 
48 UCLA L. REV. 743 (2001); Keith B. Anderson, Structure-Performance Studies of Grocery 
Retailing: A Review in COMPETITIVE STRATEGY AND ANALYSIS IN THE FOOD SYSTEM 203-212.  But 
see, Ronald W. Cotterill, Market Power in the Retail Food Industry: Evidence from Vermont, 68 
REV. ECON. & STAT. 379 (1986); Frederick E. Geithman, et. al, Concentration, Price, and Critical 
Concentration Ratios, 63 REV. ECON. & STAT. 346 (1981); R. McFall Lamm, Prices and 
Concentration in the Food Retailing Industry, 30 J. INDUS. ECON. 67 (1981). 
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As the court in Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. stated, ￿Even an act of 
pure malice by one business competitor against another does not, without more, 
state a claim under the federal antitrust laws.￿100  In Nynex v. Discon, the Court 
held that ￿other laws, for example, ￿unfair competition; laws, business tort laws, 
or regulatory laws, provide remedies for various ￿competitive practices thought 
to be offensive to proper standards of business morality.￿￿101  It appears that 
rather than engage in the complex analysis of the monopolization framework 
that has been applied to exclusionary conduct cases, the Sixth Circuit assumed 
that the conduct of USTC was widespread enough to make such an analysis 
moot, or perhaps that the non-meritorious conduct of USTC made such an 
analysis extraneous. 
6. Conclusion 
United States Tobacco faces a $1.05 billion verdict stemming from, among 
other things, abuse of its category manager position.  As alluded to earlier, USTC 
was found guilty of a Sherman Act § 2 monopolization violation because of its 
conduct in the moist snuff tobacco market, including unauthorized removal and 
destruction of competitors￿ display racks and product.  While Conwood stands as 
the seminal antitrust decision applying monopolization law to category manager 
                                                 
100 505 U.S. 209, 225 (1993).  See David Balto, The ￿Conwood￿ Decision, National Law Journal 
(Aug. 19, 2002). 
101 525 U.S. 128, 137 (1998). 
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conduct, the egregious behavior involved limits its usefulness as a guideline for 
understanding the general application of monopolization doctrine to cases 
involving category manager. 
Category management involves a retailer designating a particular 
manufacturer as ￿category captain￿ or ￿category manager.￿  The role of the 
category manager is to provide the retailer with input regarding the retailers￿ 
shelf space allocation decision and product assortment.  The fundamental 
economic question addressed by this paper is: ￿why would a retailer shift control 
over the shelf space allocation decision to a manufacturer?￿  Arrival at a proper 
answer to that question requires an understanding of the economics forces at 
work in distribution contracts involving promotional effort generally, and more 
specifically, shelf space.  Understanding the economics of category management 
is not only important from an economic theory perspective, but also in terms of 
the antitrust standard to be applied when a dominant manufacturer designated 
category manager becomes a defendant to a monopolization claim.   
Manufacturers have the incentive to subsidize dealer promotional effort, 
such as the provision of featured shelf space, in order to induce impulse sales.  In 
other words, provision of shelf space raises the reservation values of particular 
consumers that are sensitive to shelf space allocation.  Manufacturers with high 
margins of wholesale price to marginal cost have the greatest incentive to 
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subsidize dealer promotion inducing incremental sales.  Because retailers are 
unlikely to provide the jointly profit-maximizing level of shelf space without 
compensation, manufacturers must compensate retailers for the provision of 
promotional shelf space.  Manufacturer compensation of dealers can occur with 
per unit time payments such as slotting fees, or a per unit sale payment such as a 
reduction in the wholesale price.  Manufacturer compensation creates an 
incentive for the retailer to cheat on the contractual arrangement by taking the 
payments and promoting rival products with higher margins. 
Exclusive dealing is one method by which manufacturers can reduce the 
retailer￿s incentive to promote rival products.  Likewise, granting a manufacturer 
an exclusive right to shelf space also increases the value of the shelf space and 
the level of payments a retailer can demand for exclusive promotion.  However, 
exclusivity is not costless to the retailer.  Specifically, granting a manufacturer an 
exclusive right is costly to the retailer in terms of decreases its ability to satisfy 
consumer demand for product variety.  Therefore, one does not expect to 
observe exclusive dealing where consumer demand for product variety is high. 
Category management serves as a less restrictive alternative to exclusive 
dealing as a means of reducing a retailer￿s incentive to promote rival products.  
Where consumer demand for product variety is high, granting an exclusive may 
be prohibitively costly and granting a manufacturer category manager status 
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provides the retailer the best of both worlds.  The retailer can extract payments 
from the manufacturer for the provision of ￿extra￿ shelf space associated with 
the right to control the shelf space; on the other hand the retailer can minimize 
the costs associated with reduced product variety.  This explanation of category 
manager contracts provides an efficiency rationale for the practice and has 
nothing to do with raising rivals￿ costs or exclusion of rivals.   
Conwood stands as the seminal case addressing the antitrust standards 
applied to category managers alleged to have abused their designation to 
exclude rivals from access to shelf space.102  The decision sounds a warning shot 
above the heads of dominant firms contemplating offering category management 
services to retailers as it appears to impose greater duties on category managers 
than even those manufacturers granted an exclusive right to shelf space.  
                                                 
102 The decision in El Aguila Food Products, supra note 57, included allegations that Gruma 
monopolized tortilla manufacture primarily through the use of slotting fees and other 
promotional activity, but also with category management practices.  2003 U.S. Dist. at *54.  The 
court held that plaintiffs￿ Section 1 and 2 claims failed because plaintiffs had not sustained their 
burden on summary judgment to show adverse effect on competition, and that Gruma had 
market power.  Id.  Because plaintiff failed to show that Gruma had market power or that its 
practices had adversely impacted competition, the court did not specifically address, and did not 
need to, how Gruma￿s role as category manager might have caused such harm.  The recent 
decision in R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Philip Morris Inc., 199 F. Supp. 2d 362 (M.D. N.C. 2002), 
involved Philip Morris￿ ￿Retail Leaders￿ program granting discounts to consumers and making 
promotional payments to retailers in exchange for favorable display and promotional space 
within retailers￿ stores.  Philip Morris generally obtained cigarette product space in an amount 
equal or less than its market share.  Where Philip Morris￿ local market share exceeds 55%, Philip 
Morris contractually required only 90% of its share of product space.  Id. at 370.  Contracting for a 
large degree of shelf space while allowing the retailer to retain a sufficient level of shelf space to 
satisfy consumer demand for variety is an alternative to granting a category manager contract.  
However, RJR does not specifically address standards to be applied where a dominant 
manufacturer is a category manager. 
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Imposing greater duties on category managers is perverse to the economic 
explanation for designating category managers in this paper, that category 
management is a less restrictive method of facilitating the distribution contract 
than exclusive dealing. 
Conwood also stands alongside Microsoft as representing an emerging 
trend towards application of a weaker evidentiary standard with respect to the 
showing of anticompetitive effect where a court made determination is made 
that competition is not ￿on the merits.￿  In Microsoft, the anticompetitive effect 
requirement was foregone upon a court-made determination that competition 
was not ￿on the merits.￿  In Conwood, the rigorous economic analysis associated 
with modern antitrust cases was eschewed in favor assuming liability based 
upon the atmospherics of USTC￿s conduct as well as weak evidence of damages 
to Conwood.103  The argument that a different standard is justified in Conwood 
because of the egregious allegations of product destruction is not persuasive.  
Economic analysis of exclusionary distribution contracts requires a 
determination of whether or not the reduction in scale caused by defendants￿ 
conduct raised the costs of the rival sufficiently to decrease its ability to 
                                                 
103 See Herbert Hovenkamp, Book Review: The Rationalization of Antitrust, Antitrust Law by 
Richard A. Posner (2d ed. 2001), 116 Harv. L. Rev. 917, n. 135 (2003) (criticizing Conwood￿s expert 
for inventing ￿new and previously untested procedures￿ and applying a simple regression 
attributing all of Conwood￿s lack of growth in markets where USTC competed to anticompetitive 
practices without exploring alternative explanations.). 
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discipline attempted price increases by the dominant firm.  Product destruction 
is no different.  Economic analysis of raising rivals￿ costs claims is sufficient to 
address product destruction cases without altering the legal standard applied. 
Conwood presents an opportunity to allow USTC￿s extreme conduct to 
cloud the understanding of the economics involved in typical category manager 
contracts.  It is an opportunity that should not be taken.  The analysis of category 
management presented here suggests that manufacturers and retailers utilize 
category management as an alternative to exclusive dealing as mechanism for 
ensuring enforcement of contracts for product promotion.  One would expect 
that such a self-enforcing contractual arrangement, not to mention business tort 
liability, would protect retailers from the type of conduct at issue in Conwood.   
This paper provides a first step in the analysis of category manager 
contracts.  This article suggests that category management is a less restrictive 
means of facilitating promotional contracts, and thereby, a method to increase 
the value of the shelf space offered to manufacturers by retailers while 
minimizing costs associated with loss of product variety.   
Antitrust commentators have recently highlighted the importance of the 
anticompetitive effect requirement in preventing antitrust law from chilling 
competitive conduct that may not be understood.104  This paper provides an 
                                                 
104 Timothy J. Muris, The FTC and The Law of Monopolization, 67 ANTITRUST L. J. 693 (2000). 
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efficiency justification for category management distribution contracts and helps 
to shed light on the role of this increasingly frequent practice in the normal 
competitive process.  The increased frequency of category management suggests 
that most manufacturers designated as category managers are in fact performing 
in a manner consistent with the implicit understanding of the contractual 
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